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Turkish-Greek relations and the Cyprus problem following the Turkish
intervention of 1974 have occupied an important place throughout the
evolution of the relations between Turkey and the European Union (EU).1
These two issues, often linked, figured among the most difficult to handle.
The fact that Greece became a member of the EU in 1981 has complicated
matters further, especially for the EU. From that point on, the EU could no
longer keep its benevolent neutrality towards its two allies. Consequently,
the road towards the amelioration of Turkish–EU relations passed via
Athens and Nicosia,2 despite Turkey’s desire to keep the resolution of these
issues separate from the question of its accession to the EU. 
The divided island of Cyprus constitutes one of the “thousands of
problems” the current EU enlargement process entails as a whole.3 Each
candidate obviously has its own particular problems; yet, even a brief look
at the list of candidate countries may indicate that the case of Cyprus is the
most exceptional case at present. The paradox is that, at the economic and
administrative level, Cyprus is the best candidate. It is the most prosperous
among the candidate countries and has all the administrative structures
necessary for membership. But which Cyprus? Due to the Cyprus conflict,
which has remained unresolved for 39 years, this preoccupying question
has framed the Cypriot case as a politically problematic candidacy. 
The link between the Cyprus issue and the accession of Turkey to the
EU has become especially pronounced since Cyprus and Turkey both
became candidates for EU membership. As a result of the European
Council’s 1999 Helsinki summit decisions, the resolution of the Cyprus
problem is not a precondition to the accession of the Republic of Cyprus
(RoC) or Turkey to the EU. Nevertheless, Ankara is expected to play an
active role in bringing about a settlement in Cyprus as all parties
concerned perceive it as having a key part in achieving the resolution of
this imbroglio. Given this expectation and the noting of this issue as a
short-term priority of Turkey’s Accession Partnership, Cyprus is a sine qua
non for Turkey’s membership. Turkey thus finds itself obliged to modify
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its stance on this issue if it truly wants to become a part of the EU and to
contribute to the stability of the region and the wellbeing of Cypriots. 
This contribution does not aim to analyze the details of the Cyprus
problem. In order to assist the reader and provide context, a chronology of
the key events in the history of Cyprus, including the major turning points
of Cyprus’ and Turkey’s relations with the EU, appears at the end of this
piece. This contribution aspires to show how and why it is in Turkey’s best
interest to see Cyprus join the EU once a settlement is reached. As the
Greek Cypriots will be accepted to the Union even without a settlement,
an eventuality that may potentially trouble Turkey’s own European course,
Ankara will benefit from an early, rather than late, settlement. First, the
Cyprus policies of Turkey and the EU will be examined in detail. Next, the
Greek influence on the shaping of the European attitude will be
emphasized, followed by a depiction of the links between the Turkish and
Cypriot accessions to the EU and an anticipation of what lies ahead in the
near future.4
TURKISH POLICY ON CYPRUS 
Turkish policy on Cyprus is quite paradoxical. On one hand, Cyprus
remains a national cause (milli dava) and a bastion of strategic interests for
Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey argues that the resolution of the Cyprus
problem is the sole responsibility of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. As a
result of this double-edged policy, Turkey finds itself simultaneously
demanding that its interests be taken into account with regard to any
decision regarding Cyprus and denying it has any role in bringing about a
solution in Cyprus, apart from declaring that it encourages all efforts to
reach a settlement.
Why is Cyprus a national cause for Turkey? As an ancient Ottoman
territory, Cyprus has historical significance for Turkey. There is thus a
sense of national solidarity towards the Turkish Cypriots, similar to that
felt towards other Turkish populations previously under Ottoman rule.
Turkish presence on the island symbolizes and guarantees the upholding of
Turkish interests, which are predominantly of strategic value. Only 40
nautical miles away from Anatolian coasts, the extension of the Karpaz
peninsula offers Cyprus the possibility of blocking the exit from the gulf
of Iskenderun and thus threatens Turkey’s naval maneuverability.5 For this
reason, Cyprus is perceived as a dagger aiming at the stomach of Turkey.
This rather outdated military vision (outdated when one considers the
current technological circumstances) dominates the handling of the Cyprus
issue by Ankara. Beyond this rhetoric, the strategic significance of Cyprus
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seems to currently lie in the fact that it is basically a “stationary aircraft
carrier” (sabit uçak gemisi).6 There is also the argument that the loss of
Cyprus to Turkey’s historical enemy, Greece, signifies a threat against vital
Turkish interests. If Cyprus became “Greek,” the Anatolian coasts would
be encircled by a string of Greek islands. Consequently, the balance of
forces between Greece and Turkey would be destroyed, the safeguarding
of which is always of great psychological importance for Turkey.7
It was these considerations which brought about the Turkish
intervention of 1974, rather than the humanistic pretext of the protection
of the Turkish Cypriot minority. This strategic bastion has to be preserved
in one way or another at all costs. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, a staunch
hardliner on the Cyprus issue, is said to have claimed in 1998 that Cyprus
is so indispensable for the strategic interests of Turkey that Ankara would
not withdraw its troops even if there were not a single Turkish Cypriot
living on the island.8 Therefore, compromises on the rights of Turkey over
Cyprus are out of the question. In addition, it is the first territory won
against the enemy, the first contemporary victory of the Turkish army and
the first expression of the determination of Turkey to protect its interests
and to display publicly its strategic priorities.9 Consequently, none of the
political parties dare to make far-reaching concessions on Cyprus—an
issue with high nationalistic connotations—for whatever objective it may
be. Decisions like the compromise of March 6, 1995, which guaranteed
Cyprus that its accession negotiations will begin six months after the
conclusion of the 1996 IGC (Intergovernmental Conference) in return for
the lifting of the Greek veto on the customs union agreement with Turkey,
provoked comments such as “Cyprus has been sold” from the public and
media. Turkish nationalists especially emphasize that compromising on
Cyprus would trigger losses of other vital interests of the country.
Turkish Reaction to the Republic of Cyprus’Application for EU Membership
When the Republic of Cyprus applied for membership to the EU in 1990,
Turkish leaders were alarmed. The Greek presence in the EU already
prevented the amelioration of relations between Turkey and Europe, and
now the Greeks would obtain a second veto against Turkey, in addition to
their own. The balance established by the treaties founding Cyprus was
being threatened. 
Turkey insisted that the Cypriot application, as such, should be
unacceptable to the EU. Consequently, Turkey requested the advice of
experts on international law, namely Maurice H. Mendelson10 and Christian
Heinze,11 to convince Europe and the rest of the international community
that the Greek Cypriot application was against principles of international
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law, which the EU claims to always respect. Mendelson pointed to Article
185 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus—an “unamendable”
disposition—which stipulates, “The integral or partial union of Cyprus with
any other State is excluded.” He argued that the intention of the treaties
establishing the Republic of Cyprus was to prevent the possibility of giving
Greece or Turkey a more favorable economic position on the island which
would amount to an economic enosis (unification of Cyprus with Greece).
For this reason Article 8 of the Constitution underlined that “The President
and the Vice President separately or conjointly, shall have the right of final
veto on any law or decision concerning foreign affairs, except the
participation of the Republic of Cyprus in international organizations and
pacts of alliance in which Greece and Turkey both participate.” This was
interpreted as the president and the vice president having a veto right on the
accession of Cyprus to organizations of which only one of these two states
was a member, which of course would include the EU. Mendelson
concluded that the Greek Cypriot administration had no right to apply for
membership to the EU nor could it become a member as long as Turkey
remained outside the EU. 
These arguments, however, have not succeeded in persuading the
European Union, since it interpreted the Cyprus question differently.
Furthermore, for EU officials, the issue of Cyprus’ accession is an
eminently political debate, and law can adapt itself to any political
solution.12 On the other hand, Turkey’s staunch emphasis on international
law with regard to Cyprus has become rather hypocritical following the
rulings of the European Court of Human Rights on Cyprus that Turkey still
refuses to abide by.
Turkey had hoped that accession negotiations with Cyprus would not be
launched before the resolution of the Cyprus conflict. Ankara has stated
repeatedly that it neither wants the Union to become involved in the Cyprus
question, nor does it approve of the EU having an active role in the
negotiations for settlement in Cyprus. As Greece is a member of the EU,
Turkey is convinced the Union cannot be impartial. Accordingly, Turkey
even resented the appointment of an EU observer to these settlement talks.13
When the decision to open accession negotiations with Cyprus was
taken simultaneously with the decision to put into force the customs union
with Turkey, the prime minister at the time, Tansu Çiller, was fiercely
criticized. The opposition parties blamed her government for having
agreed to this historical compromise which “sold Cyprus,” even though
the minister of foreign affairs, Murat Karayalçın, declared during the
March 6, 1995 Association Council meeting—where these decisions had
been finalized—that Turkey’s Cyprus policy had not changed at all. 
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This historical compromise by Turkey naturally had repercussions in
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Many Turkish Cypriots
had the impression that Turkey could abandon them for the sake of its own
interests, seeing the TRNC as but a bargaining card.14 To counter this
perception, Turkey and the TRNC signed a common declaration on
December 28, 1995, which asserted that they only approve the accession
of Cyprus to the EU within the framework of a definite solution of the
Cyprus problem. The same declaration maintained that the ties between
the two countries would be reinforced at the economic and political levels.
Meanwhile, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus launched the “Joint
Defense Dogma” in December 1993 with the aim of improving the
coordination of the defense of Hellenic space against Turkish
expansionism. The Dogma has been put into action through joint military
exercises (called Nikiphoros) and the construction of a new air base in
Paphos. Alarmed by this attempt to change the balance of power in the
region, the Turkish government protested vigorously when the Republic of
Cyprus announced its decision to purchase Russian S-300 missiles with a
range of 150km in January 1997.15 These missiles have been perceived as
a direct threat to the security of Turkey, and the Turkish army has indicated
that the move will be perceived as a casus belli and threatened preventive
bombing should the missiles be deployed in Cyprus.16
The common declaration of January 20, 1997, signed between Turkey
and the TRNC, was orchestrated within this context. The two parties were
convinced that the Greek Cypriots aimed for indirect enosis through
membership in the EU. To restore balance, they announced their intention
of creating a concept of common defense: any attack against the TRNC
would be considered an attack on Turkey. Furthermore, the declaration
warned, “All steps taken by the Greek Cypriot Administration towards
accession to the EU will accelerate the integration of the TRNC with
Turkey.”17
Similar declarations followed, finally resulting in an agreement on
August 6, 1997, establishing the Association Council between Turkey and
the TRNC, engineering partial integration at the economic, military and
foreign policy levels. When the European Council Luxembourg summit
declared that the EU would start accession negotiations with Cyprus and
excluded Turkey from the list of candidates for the next wave of EU
enlargement, the TRNC President Rauf Denktaş and Mesut Yılmaz, the
Turkish prime minister of the time, firmly indicated that this decision left
them a single option: integration. The TRNC followed Turkey’s path of
breaking off all contacts with the EU. Symbolically, the first meeting of the
Association Council between Turkey and the TRNC took place on March
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31, 1998, the day the EU began accession negotiations with the Republic
of Cyprus. 
Gradually, the Turkish stand moved further away from the idea that the
solution of the Cyprus problem should be through the formation of a
federation. The Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot governments started stating
openly that the two sovereign states on the island should be recognized. This
position, relatively softened with the proposition of Rauf Denktaş in favor
of establishing a Cypriot federation, was made public on August 31, 1998.
Turkey gave this proposition full support with a common declaration on
July 20, 1999.18 All these acts were a manifestation of Turkish foreign policy
that proclaims itself as reactive, in the sense that it is formed as a response
to positions taken by Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, and the EU. Turkey
argued that since these three had modified all the parameters of the Cyprus
question, Turkey and the TRNC could do the same.19
When the Agenda 2000 and the European Council Luxembourg
summit Declaration excluded Turkey even from the list of candidates for
the second round of enlargement, this provoked an outcry in Turkey. The
EU, aware of the risk of alienating Turkey by excluding it from the list of
candidates, had invited it to the European Conference to show that Turkey
would one day become a candidate for membership. However, Turkish
leaders were offended by the text of the Presidency Conclusions of the
Luxembourg summit referring to the European Conference which
underlined the following:
The members of the Conference must share a common commitment
to peace, security and good neighborliness, respect for other
countries’ sovereignty, the principles upon which the European
Union is founded, the integrity and inviolability of external borders
and the principles of international law and a commitment to the
settlement of territorial disputes by peaceful means, in particular
through the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the
Hague. Countries which endorse these principles and respect the
right of any European country fulfilling the required criteria to
accede to the European Union and sharing the Union’s commitment
to building a Europe free of divisions and difficulties of the past will
be invited to take part in the Conference.20
This diplomatic formulation, which conditioned the participation in the
Conference to a commitment to these principles, troubled Turkish national
pride. Basically, the EU was imposing what it considered as the viable
solution to Greek-Turkish problems and the Cyprus issue. It was also
pressing forward the idea that Cyprus could accede to the Union once it
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fulfilled the accession criteria. Yet, the Turkish government was convinced
that the decisions on these issues concerned Turkey alone. The EU should
not encroach upon the sovereignty of the country. Above all, it should not
interfere with issues considered of critical national importance. As a result,
Turkey categorically refused all the above conditions and did not
participate in the European Conference. 
The strategies developed by the EU exclusively for Turkey, namely the
French idea of assembling all the candidate countries at the European
Conference, proved insufficient for overcoming the resentment of Turkish
leaders. Ankara cut off all political dialogue with the EU until the Union
abandoned what the Turkish officials saw as its discriminatory attitude
towards Turkey, and waited for the EU to correct its “historical error.” This
long-awaited day came with the Helsinki summit, when Turkey finally
became the thirteenth candidate for accession.
Prior to the Helsinki summit, the EU strategy had been to pressure
Turkey by highlighting that Turkish-EU relations could be improved if,
among other conditions, Turkey contributed to a resolution of the Cyprus
question that would reunite the island and lead to the accession of Cyprus
to the EU. This strategy would surely help to resolve the Cyprus question,
as well as the problems related to the accession of Cyprus to the EU, if
Turkey acknowledged that the revision of its policy on Cyprus constituted
virtually a precondition for its own accession. Turkey, however, has
refused viewing the revision of its policy on Cyprus as a precondition and,
to the contrary, has taken measures towards closer integration with the
TRNC. The fact that it felt alienated by the EU has therefore complicated
matters further in Cyprus.
The 1999 Helsinki Summit and its Aftermath 
As the strategy of excluding Turkey from the list of candidates only caused
the hardening of the Turkish position, the EU changed its policy towards
Turkey by announcing Turkey’s official candidacy for membership at the
European Council Helsinki summit. It was hoped that Turkey’s accession
process would also contribute to the resolution of the Cyprus problem. The
expectation was that Turkey, as one of the major actors in Cyprus, would
modify its position to break the deadlock on the island. Yet, Turkish
politicians still tend to separate the Cyprus problem from the issue of
Turkey’s EU membership, mainly due to domestic political concerns.
The ambiguous language of the Helsinki conclusions initially led
Turkish leaders to mistakenly believe that the EU would not undermine
Turkey’s interests, so that when the time came the EU would not let the
Greek Cypriots join without the resolution of the Cyprus question. When
the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, made it clear
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during his visit to the Republic of Cyprus in October 2001 that Cyprus
would be among the first wave of EU members, irrespective of a political
settlement, there was finally a realization that “the Cyprus issue was not
going well for Turkey.”21 This acknowledgment was accompanied by a
recourse to threats: the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time,
İsmail Cem, declared that “Turkey might be forced to take drastic
measures” in the event of a Greek Cypriot accession prior to an agreement
on the Cyprus question.22 This was followed by statements by Prime
Minister Ecevit that Turkey could annex the TRNC if the EU admitted
Cyprus before a settlement.23
These unexpected threats led an EU Commission spokesman to express
regret over the hardening tone and warned that annexation of Northern
Cyprus would probably jeopardize Ankara’s own hopes of joining the
EU.24 The European Parliament had already made it clear in its report
published in July 2001 that “if Turkey were to carry out its threat of
annexing the north of Cyprus in response to Cypriot accession to the EU
and to proclaim the northern part as its 82nd province in clear breach of
international law, it would put an end to its own ambitions of European
Union membership.”25 This tension has relatively declined with the
opening of direct talks between the two community leaders in Cyprus. 
THE CYPRUS POLICY OF THE EU AND THE GREEK FACTOR 
Whereas Turkish politicians have concerns (mentioned above) which
shape Turkish policy on Cyprus, the EU has had its own internal
considerations and precedents that generated its Cyprus policy. First, EU
members in general seek to use the enlargement process for promoting
their own interests or for exteriorizing their interior problems.26 That said,
Cyprus presents a fundamental political interest for an EU member:
Greece. Greece has utilized all possible instruments within the EU to
support the membership application of Cyprus. Even though Greece is a
small country in the Union it has managed to make its voice heard
concerning issues of importance for Greek foreign policy.27 Wielding the
veto stick in the Council of Ministers, Athens has influenced EU policy
vis-à-vis Cyprus. The Greek influence can be described as a negative
influence as this influence has led the EU, at times, to take certain
unwanted decisions.28 However, this claim is rejected by Greek diplomats,
who point out that Greece has not been confronted with any pressure to
refrain from using its right to veto.29
Nevertheless, as the EU machinery functions on compromise, the EU
has managed to balance this negative influence by linking every
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compromise made to Greece to a compromise by Greece on other issues
that the EU wanted to press forward. Thus, each substantial success that
Greece has obtained towards the progress of the Cypriot candidature was
a result of a compromise it made regarding the progress of the Turkish
candidature. Even though the EU had hoped that Greece’s accession would
not affect Turkey-EU relations,30 the functioning of EU organs constrains
the EU sphere of action. No one can say that Greece has no right to insist
on issues concerning its national interests because this is the right of each
EU member state. 
In principle, though, the EU has always sought to maintain a balanced
approach towards its two allies, Greece and Turkey, by avoiding
involvement in Greek-Turkish conflicts. This benevolent neutrality is
notably observable in the fact that the Association Agreement with Greece
was followed by the Association Agreement with Turkey. Allegedly, once
Greece applied for membership to the EU, Turkey was encouraged to
follow suit in order to safeguard the equal treatment of these two NATO
allies—although this recommendation was not undertaken by the Turkish
government at the time. Consequently, when Athens joined the EU in
1981, the Community found itself inevitably drawn into the relations
between these two countries.31 From that point on, the Community was
obliged to be careful in order not to push Turkey away from Europe, or the
West in general, which would have had undesirable consequences
(especially during the cold war). This cautious policy prevented it from
taking a firmer stance towards Turkey, even if it continued to deplore the
Turkish military presence in Cyprus. The cost of sanctions, for example,
would be too high. As long as Turkey remained outside, the EU could
afford to be more flexible in order to preserve its ally. 
Once Turkey and Cyprus materialized their European vocations
through their applications for membership, the Community developed its
Cyprus policy.32 The European Parliament had notably adopted several
resolutions conveying that the solution of the Cyprus problem would lead
to the amelioration of the relations between the EU and Turkey.33 The
December 1989 opinion of the European Commission on the Turkish
application also stated resolutely that the evaluation of the political aspects
of the application would be incomplete if it did not take into consideration
the negative effects of the disagreements between Turkey and a member
state (Greece), but also the situation in Cyprus. Thus, the Cyprus problem
had to be resolved if Turkey genuinely wanted to join the EU.
Once it became evident that the Cyprus policy of Turkey was
incompatible with its vocation to join the Community, the fact that Turkey
did not alter this policy not only allowed Greece to gain the support of its
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European partners but also reflected the non-credibility of the European
orientation of Turkey.34 Meanwhile, three developments during the 1980s
forced the Community to take a more activist position regarding Cyprus:35
• The accession of Greece to the EU;
• The denunciation by the Greek Cypriot political elite of enosis as a
political objective (November 1981);
• The progressive consolidation of the Turkish Cypriot administration as
a separate state.
The accession of Greece has rendered the option of enosis obsolete as the
annexation of Cyprus by Greece would clearly violate the sovereignty of
an associated state by a member state.36 The viability of the Cypriot state
was hence reinforced. As a result, the pro-enosists in Greece and Cyprus
were weakened, which allowed the removal of enosis from the agenda of
the Greek Cypriot government. The EU has therefore willingly let Greece
Europeanize the Cyprus question. After all, while the enosis option ceased
to exist, the occupation of the Turkish army remained.37
Turkey, however, has chosen to blame the influence of Greek pressure
and has accused the EU of submission to Greek blackmail. Particularly
because of the three developments aforementioned, there were many other
voices within the Union favoring a more activist position, as advanced by
Greece.38 Yet, on each relevant occasion, Ankara severely criticized the
European stance on Cyprus, repeating that it had not occupied Cyprus. In
Turkey’s eyes, the EU persisted in its erroneous assessment of the Cyprus
question and thus adopted a Cyprus policy based on the Greek view.39
The Greek Presidency of the EU had already established during the
Corfu summit in 1994 that the next enlargement would include Cyprus.
However, the “historical compromise” of 1995 marked the beginning of
the give-and-take process on Cyprus.40 During the 1997 Luxembourg
summit, it has been claimed that Greece again asserted that it would only
approve the list of the first-wave candidates if Cyprus was included and
negotiations with it would begin.41 One eurocrat claims that this Greek
influence was the only reason the EU started accession negotiations with
Cyprus, denying analyses which argue that the Union wanted to increase
its political role by contributing to the resolution of the Cyprus conflict.42
While the accession negotiations with the RoC moved forward
successfully, there was no progress on the resolution of the Cyprus
problem. To the contrary, the inter-communal talks which broke down in
1997—under the Turkish Cypriot party’s pretext of the European
Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with Cyprus—were
interrupted until December 1999. It is in this context that the new
Helsinki package was orchestrated in order to obtain Greek agreement to
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Turkey’s candidacy.43 The European Council of Helsinki, while
welcoming the launch of the talks aiming at a comprehensive solution of
the Cyprus problem and underlining that a political settlement will
facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union, concluded: “If
no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession
negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without
the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all
relevant factors.”44
While the European Union still bases its position with regard to
Cyprus’ accession on the Helsinki decisions, the conclusions of the June
21–22, 2002 Seville European Council confirmed that the EU’s preference
continues to be for the accession of a reunited island.45 Yet, if the current
negotiations in Cyprus fail, the undesirable eventuality of the accession of
a divided Cyprus appears predictable. Any other option would endanger
the entire enlargement project: Greece repeats its threat of vetoing the
accession of Central and East European states in the event that Cyprus is
excluded from the first wave of enlargement.46 Greece’s argument refers to
the accession criteria, emphasizing that a candidate who fulfills these
cannot be prevented from joining the Union. Thus, if the EU is a
community of values, the exclusion of Cyprus will not be morally
justifiable. Clearly, this argument is highly valid for the EU, which aspires
to function according to well-established principles. Yet again, it can be
recalled that the EU had asked the Central and Eastern European countries
to settle their minority and border disputes through the Balladur Stability
Pact before accession. Still, settling the Cyprus problem is not a condition
that the RoC has to fulfill, as stated in the Helsinki decisions. This means
that the EU will be accepting a state that claims to be occupied and
therefore unable to apply accession criteria to those occupied territories.
The EU, then, can obviously be selective on what set of principles or
criteria to apply for a given case, according to its interests, which makes
the moral argument advanced in European circles questionable. 
The truth is, since the Eastern enlargement constitutes a major interest
for all EU members, they do not want to see the entire process blocked
because of a small Mediterranean island. Moreover, at the moment of the
first round of enlargement, there will be a package of candidate states. The
EU may continue to say that since the Helsinki summit it has adopted the
principle of evaluating each candidate on its own merit. However, at the
end of the day, this appears to be more rhetorical than what will happen in
practice. As in the past, the EU prefers the accession of a group of
countries to single accessions. Therefore, when the moment comes, even
the member states that are reticent regarding the accession of a divided
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Cyprus will not be able to vote against the accession of Cyprus when they
wish to see other candidates accede. 
THE LINKS BETWEEN THE TURKISH AND CYPRIOT ACCESSIONS 
The compromise packages made so far concerning Turkey and Cyprus
confirm the linkage between the Turkish and Cypriot candidatures for
membership to the EU. Although Turkey cannot block the accession of
Cyprus to the EU by refusing to contribute to the resolution of the Cyprus
conflict, this strategy would jeopardize the accession of Turkey, as well as
the accession of Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, the status quo is only to the
benefit of the Greek Cypriots, who will be able to join the EU even if the
Cyprus problem is not settled. Consequently, instead of having mixed
Cypriot delegations within EU organs and the voice of Turkish Cypriots in
favor of Turkey, there will be Greek Cypriot officials insisting on more EU
pressure on Turkey, especially regarding Cyprus issues. It is likely that the
Greek Cypriot government will not be favourable towards Turkey’s
membership of the EU.
Greek and Turkish Cypriots, as well as EU officials, list such key
arguments demonstrating that it is in the interest of Turkey to see the
settlement of the Cyprus problem. After all, Cyprus—as an EU member—
would not threaten the strategic interests of Turkey in any way.
Accordingly, they are convinced that Turkey would not sacrifice the
prospect of its membership because of the Cyprus problem.
On the other hand, the fact that the progress of the Cypriot and Turkish
applications was made through compromising should not give the
impression that Cyprus is a valuable bargaining card in Turkey’s hands.
Although Turkey’s contribution to the reunification of the island will
definitely improve its relations with Europe, as well as with Greece,
unification alone will not guarantee Turkish membership in the EU.
Cyprus is only one of the short-term priorities included in the Accession
Partnership with Turkey. As a matter of fact, the withdrawal of Turkish
troops from Northern Cyprus is the minimum price Turkey will be
required to pay,47 as “it is inconceivable in a community based on the rule
of law that one Member State should station troops in part of the territory
of another Member State without the explicit agreement of the latter.”48 No
one denies that Turkey is an important partner whose degree of satisfaction
matters to the EU, but it should not abuse the Cypriot card.49 The decision
at Helsinki stipulating that the resolution of the Cyprus problem would not
constitute a precondition to the accession of Cyprus signaled precisely that
to Turkey. Some predict that an encouraging move towards Turkey will
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take place if Ankara works toward improving the situation in Cyprus, but
this move will not be accession to the Union,50 contrary to Turkish hopes. 
However, many Turkish politicians do not agree with these arguments.
There is a tendency in general to overestimate the influence of Turkey.
There is also a belief that realpolitik requires that the EU take Turkey’s
opinions into consideration; otherwise, Europe will have to face the
consequences.51 Furthermore, strategists continue to claim that Cyprus is
of primary strategic importance, especially since the construction project
of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline makes the security of this part of the
Mediterranean even more vital than before. 
If Turkey has managed to maintain its Cyprus policy since 1974, at the
risk of alienating its allies,52 it should not compromise now. If Turkey is to
renounce its rights on Cyprus, that should only be done in exchange for an
important gain, that is, membership to the EU. Yet Euro-skeptics in Turkey
claim that the EU will never admit Turkey to its ranks; therefore, there is
no need to concede regarding Cyprus, hoping that this would bring Turkey
closer to Europe. Jean-François Drevet argues that Turks have an interest
in keeping their “booty,” selling it for the best price when the time comes.53
If the Europeans do not want Turkey’s accession, the island could
indefinitely remain hostage, according to Drevet, who points out that—
paradoxically—its candidature could lead Turkey to stick more
vehemently to its conquest. As for the official Turkish foreign policy line
on Cyprus, it constantly insists that Turkey does not consider the Cyprus
issue a precondition to stronger relations with the EU. Therefore, in
Turkey there is either an overestimation or an underestimation of the role
of the Cyprus question on Turkish-EU relations.
It is clear that Turkey’s attitude towards a potential settlement in Cyprus
counts considerably. It is unclear to outside observers to what extent the
TRNC authorities are dependent on, or independent from, Turkish
authorities when it comes to decisionmaking regarding the fate of Turkish
Cypriots. Nevertheless, given that the Turkish army and Turkish economic
support constitute the most important bases of power for the TRNC, Turkish
Cypriots would obviously have even more incentive for arriving at a
settlement should Turkey pressure the TRNC. At the very least, if Turkey
gave a clear and unambiguous signal that it wants to see the Cyprus problem
solved—instead of merely declaring support for the negotiations—it would
give a strong impetus to the talks on Cyprus. Such a clear message would
also refute the Greek Cypriot argument that Turkey and the TRNC are
intransigent and do not genuinely want a solution in Cyprus.
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CONCLUSION 
The dialogue of the deaf between the Union and Turkey with regard to
Cyprus has continued despite overtures made to Turkey, which began at
Helsinki.54 The EU insists that the pre-accession strategy for Turkey is
closely linked to the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations and the
resolution of the Cyprus problem. Turkey is adamant that its Cyprus policy
remains the same: the Cyprus problem belongs to the two communities on
the island and is theirs to solve. As Turkish leaders insist on Turkey’s
sensitivities, so the EU insists on its own interests. The EU does not accept
a third party blocking the accession of Cyprus, which means it will not
accord a voice to Turkey on this issue. Europe is wary not to create
precedents which could possibly open the way for other third countries to
claim a similar right concerning their national interests.
If the EU is convinced that Turkey is capable of contributing to the
solution of the Cyprus problem it is because of the well-founded conviction
that Turkey has decisive leverage on the TRNC. Given its close political
ties and dialogue with the Turkish Cypriot community, Turkey has more
capacity to make itself heard in Northern Cyprus than any other actor.55 The
Turkish Cypriots are also aware of this strong Turkish influence, and they
judge that the prospect of the EU membership will eventually oblige Turkey
to work for a solution in Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots have thus welcomed the
Helsinki decisions, as many of them believe that Turkey will preserve
Cyprus as a bargaining card until its own accession.56 It is therefore
essential that Turkey dedicates itself to preparing for its own membership
so that it could start its accession negotiations as soon as possible. 
Certainly, symbolic declarations of support for the talks in Cyprus are
important, but it is time that Turkey effectuate a fundamental change of
attitude and policy regarding Cyprus. Furthermore, Turkey’s threats of
annexing the TRNC are not regarded as credible by the Greek Cypriots or
in Europe, as Turkey has used this diplomatic arm before to push for its
national interests. This recourse to threats is rather a self-defeating policy
for Turkey as enforcing them will demand a high price, which brings into
question the actual credibility of these threats and, therefore, largely
renders them ineffective. 
Turkey’s membership process retains its uncertainty, as it is still
unclear when Turkey will be able to begin actual accession negotiations,
despite the Turkish parliament’s crucial decisions to amend the
Constitution in line with the EU accession criteria in the hope of obtaining
a date during the Copenhagen European Council. Before the adoption of
these reforms, the Commissioner for Enlargement, Günter Verheugen,
signaled that the European Commission was against politically motivated
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bargaining with respect to Turkey, underlining that Turkey was still
lagging behind in fulfilling the political criteria of membership.57 Hence,
Verheugen has played down the raised expectation of a date for accession
negotiations at the upcoming Copenhagen European Council even if
Turkey would adopt a positive attitude on the issues of Cyprus and NATO-
ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) cooperation.58 On the other
hand, the June 2002 Seville European Council noted, “New decisions
could be taken in Copenhagen on the next stage of Turkey’s candidature in
the light of the developments in the situation between the Seville and
Copenhagen European Councils.”59 This could well be interpreted as
encouragement and support of Turkey’s EU membership efforts. 
As for Cyprus, the question seems to be more whether it will join the
EU as a unified island or not rather than whether Cyprus will be included
in the first wave of enlargement. The answer to that question will depend
on whether the direct talks, started between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot
leaders in January 2001, will finally lead to the surpassing of the
antagonisms between the two communities in Cyprus. Even though the
pressure on the parties to arrive at a resolution is stronger than ever, it is
uncertain whether the two sides will be able to agree on a settlement. If one
thing is clear, though, it is that any eventual settlement will be far from the
ideal solution each side envisages for Cyprus. The challenge, as always, is
to accept compromises, however painful they might be, as they are
essential for arriving at a solution.
The prospect of accession of Cyprus to the EU has not served as a
catalyst for the settlement of the Cyprus problem, as was hoped by many.
Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the fact that “the approaching EU
deadline for the accession of the Republic of Cyprus was one of the critical
factors inducing the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish sides to re-embark upon
a peace process.”60
Many in Europe hoped that the significance of the relations between
Turkey and the EU and the aspirations of Turkey of becoming a member
of the EU would lead Turkey to change its Cyprus policy so as to bring
about a solution in Cyprus. Accordingly, the Greek Cypriots believed that
the EU could force Turkey to contribute to the solution of the Cyprus
problem through the membership process to the EU. The resolutions by
EU organs linking Turkey’s accession to the settlement of the Cyprus issue
have thus encouraged the Greek Cypriots who already firmly believed that
“the key to a solution in Cyprus is Ankara.”61 Greek Cypriots, as well as
others, anticipated that Turkey would finally be obliged to change its
intransigent stance and abandon the Turkish Cypriots in order to
ameliorate its international image and be accepted to the European club.62
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Turkey has had difficulty meeting the political requirements since its
accession partnership agreement was signed in March 2001. Even though
there have been significant amendments of legislation, the problem lies at
the level of implementation. Moreover, due to the economic crisis the
country has experienced as of the end of 2000, the economic criteria have
also become a problematic area. Turkey is thus in urgent need of working
seriously on its membership track. As nobody is forcing Turkey to become
a member of the EU, it is up to Turkey now to prove the seriousness of its
European vocation. It is time to take concrete measures, and the Cyprus
question could be the easiest to tackle if Turkish leaders realize (or perhaps
decide) where their real interest lies.
Furthermore, it is up to Turkey to transcend its national pride,63 which
is incompatible with its vocation to join the EU. It is Turkey that aspires to
become a member of the European club; it is thus Turkey that has to adapt
itself to the values of this club. Clearly, this adaptation requires also a
reorientation of its political attitudes.64
After all, the prospect of EU accession necessitates a fundamental
change of vision, especially concerning policies based on a traditional
perception of national sovereignty. Today, sovereignty depends very much
on the inter-subjective relations between states: states are sovereign only
through their counterparts; it is the “other,” through its behavior or acts,
which determines sovereignty or the “degree” of sovereignty.65 This
applies to Turkey as well as for the both parties in Cyprus. All three parties
need to embrace the principles of the EU if they see their future in the
Union, where even the smallest countries prosper without regretting the
loss of sovereignty membership entails.66
POSTSCRIPT
Following the November 2002 parliamentary elections in Turkey, the new
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP)
government has been advocating policy change with respect to Cyprus.
The AKP leader Erdoğan’s public statements mark a departure from the
previous Turkish policy of passive support for the negotiations towards a
settlement in Cyprus. Acknowledging that “no-solution is not a solution,”67
the government wants the Cyprus issue resolved. Erdoğan has also
recognized the link between the Cyprus issue and Turkey’s EU
membership and tried to convince EU officials and member states that
giving a date for Turkey’s accession negotiations would pave the way to
settlement in Cyprus.
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After Kofi Annan presented the Basis for Agreement on a
Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem on November 11, 2002
the Turkish government has actively encouraged the TRNC President
Denktaș to accept the plan as a basis for further negotiations.68 In view of
the concerns expressed by the two sides, Annan presented a revised
proposal on December 10, 2002. If both sides had signed this, then the
Copenhagen Council Conclusions would have referred to the “United
Cyprus.”
The agreement was not signed, the Copenhagen Council announced, as
expected, that Cyprus would become a member of the EU on May 1, 2004.
February 28, 2003 has been set as the final date for arriving at a
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. In case of a settlement,
the Council, acting by unanimity on the basis of proposals by the
Commission, shall decide upon adaptations of the terms concerning the
accession of Cyprus to the EU with regard to the Turkish Cypriot
community. In the absence of a settlement, the application of the acquis to
the northern part of the island shall be suspended, until the Council decides
unanimously otherwise, on the basis of a proposal by the Commission.69
Despite the legislative reforms passed and the declared commitment of
the new government to EU membership, Copenhagen failed to give any
definite perspective on Turkey’s membership track. It only asserted that
the EU will open accession negotiations if the European Council in
December 2004 decides, on the basis of a recommendation by the
Commission, that Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen criteria.70
It remains to be seen whether a settlement will be reached by the
February 28, 2003 deadline. So far, the Greek Cypriot side has appeared
willing to sign the agreement despite the fact that recent public opinion
surveys in the RoC have shown that 59 percent of the Greek Cypriot
population would vote against the “Annan Plan” if a referendum were to
take place now.71 The forthcoming February 7, 2003 presidential elections
in the RoC also constitute a pressing reason to agree on a settlement sooner
rather than later, as it cannot be guaranteed that the successive president
will be equally prepared to sign the agreement, given public opinion.
Even though the Turkish Cypriot side has expressed its willingness to
negotiate a final settlement on the basis of the revised Annan Plan, it still
has some major reservations about the proposal. However, opinion polls
indicate that 51.5 percent of Turkish Cypriots approve of the plan.72 The
legitimacy of Denktaș is thus increasingly questioned, while civil society
groups in the TRNC demonstrate en masse in support of the Annan Plan.73
The current Turkish government is evidently committed to reform in
view of EU membership and Cyprus constitutes one of the first obstacles to
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overcome. It is still uncertain whether the Turkish government’s moderate
stance will prevail over the traditional Cyprus policy favored by the Turkish
Foreign Ministry and the current Turkish Cypriot leadership. The press
statement by the Turkish Foreign Ministry on December 18, 2002 was very
much in line with the longstanding Turkish position.74 Remarkably, the
statement also declared that Turkey does not accept the Copenhagen
Conclusions with regard to Cyprus on legal and political grounds.
Obviously, the extensive public debate on Cyprus will continue; only time
will tell if the outcome will bring the winds of change or keep the status quo.
CHRONOLOGY
February 11, 1959: Zurich Agreements signed between the United
Kingdom (UK), Greece, and Turkey about the founding principles of the
Republic of Cyprus (RoC).
February 19, 1959: London Agreements signed between the UK, Greece,
and Turkey about the founding principles of the RoC.
August 16, 1960: Proclamation of the independence of the RoC.
September 12, 1963: Association Agreement (the Ankara Agreement)
signed between Turkey and the EU. 
November 30, 1963: Archbishop Makarios proposed to his vice president,
Fazıl Küçük, 13 amendments that would facilitate the functioning of the
state apparatus, as the inapplicability of several dispositions of the
Constitution had been proven in the eyes of Greek Cypriots.
December 21, 1963: “Bloody Christmas” is claimed to have caused the
death of two Turkish Cypriots, murdered by Greek Cypriot policemen,
aimed to force Turkish Cypriots to accept the 13 constitutional
amendments. Following these events, the Turkish Cypriots abandoned
their places in the parliament and the administration. 
March 4, 1964: The United Nations (UN) Security Council passed
Resolution 186 (1964), which stationed a force—the UNFICYP (United
Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus)—for maintaining peace and
putting an end to violence in Cyprus. The reference in this resolution to the
“Government of the Republic of Cyprus” marked the first instance of the
recognition of the Greek Cypriot administration as the legal government of
Cyprus.
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December 1, 1964: Association Agreement between Turkey and the EU
came into force.
December 19, 1972: Association Agreement between the Republic of
Cyprus and the EU signed.
June 1, 1973: Association Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and
the EU came into force.
July 15, 1974: Coup d’état organized by the Greek military junta in power
and executed by EOKA-B (the Greek acronym for “the national
organization of Cypriot fighters”) against President Makarios. 
July 20, 1974: Turkish intervention in Cyprus to prevent enosis, to put an
end to inter-communal fighting and to save the Turkish Cypriots. 
August 16, 1974: Second offensive move by the Turkish army, which led
to the occupation of 37 percent of the northern part of the island by the
Turkish army and subsequently to the territorial regrouping of the
populations of the two communities. 
February 13, 1975: Proclamation of the establishment of the Turkish
Cypriot Federal State (Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devleti).
February 12, 1977: High-level Agreement between President Rauf Denktaș
and Archbishop Makarios setting the basis for the inter-communal talks.
May 19, 1979: Ten-point Agreement between Presidents Rauf Denktaş
and Spyros Kyprianou setting the basis for the inter-communal talks.
November 15, 1983: Proclamation of independence of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti—TRNC).
Only Turkey recognizes the TRNC, whereas the RoC, which only controls
the Southern zone and includes only the Greek Cypriots, Maronites,
Armenians, and other minorities, is recognized as the sole legitimate state
by all other states. 
November 18, 1983: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 541
(1983), which deplores this declaration of secession, considers the
proclamation invalid, and demands its annulment and calls for all the states
to recognize no other state than the Republic of Cyprus. 
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April 14, 1987: Application for full membership to the EU by Turkey.
January 1, 1988: Customs union protocol between the Republic of
Cyprus and the EU came into force.
December 18, 1989: Opinion of the European Commission rejected the
Turkish application but confirmed the eligibility of Turkey for
membership.
July 4, 1990: Application for full membership to the EU by the
government of the Republic of Cyprus in the name of the whole island.
June 30, 1993: European Commission’s opinion in favor of the opening of
accession negotiations with Cyprus.
October 4, 1993: European Council approves the Commission’s opinion
during its summit in Luxembourg.
June 24–25, 1994: European Council of Corfu declared that the next
enlargement of the Union would encompass Cyprus and Malta. 
March 6, 1995: The “historical compromise” that guaranteed Cyprus its
accession negotiations would begin six months after the conclusion of the
1996 IGC. In return, Greece lifted its veto on the customs union agreement
with Turkey.
January 1, 1996: Entry into force of the Customs Union between the EU
and Turkey.
December 12–13, 1997: The decision to start negotiations with the RoC
taken by the European Council of Luxembourg.
March 12, 1998: The Greek Cypriot President, Glafcos Clerides, invited
the Turkish Cypriot community to join the Cypriot negotiation team. The
British Presidency of the EU transmitted the invitation extended to Turkish
Cypriot leaders during the European Conference in London. The invitation
was refused by the TRNC.
March 31, 1998: Accession negotiations started with the RoC.
November 10, 1998: Beginning of substantial negotiations for accession
with the RoC.
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December 10–11, 1999: European Council Helsinki summit asserted that
the political settlement in Cyprus would not constitute a precondition for
the accession of Cyprus to the European Union; the candidacy of Turkey
made official after Greece lifted its veto.
December 4, 2001: Decision to start face-to-face talks between Presidents
Denktaș and Clerides.
December 14–15, 2001: European Council meeting in Laeken expressed
its determination to bring the accession negotiations to a successful
conclusion—by the end of 2002—with those countries that will be ready,
and listed Cyprus as one of the countries which could be ready if the
present rate of negotiations and reforms is maintained.
January 21, 2002: Beginning of intensive and open-ended rounds of
negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders. 
November 11, 2002: UN Secretary General Kofi Annan presented the Basis
for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem.
December 12–13, 2002: European Council of Copenhagen welcomed
Cyprus as a member of the EU from May 1, 2004 regardless of the
resolution of the Cyprus issue.
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